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Abstract
Static and dynamic games are important tools for the analysis of strategic in-
teractions among economic agents and have found many applications in economics.
In many games equilibria can be described as solutions of polynomial equations.
In this paper we describe state-of-the-art techniques for nding all solutions of
polynomial systems of equations and illustrate these techniques by computing all
equilibria of both static and dynamic games with continuous strategies. We com-
pute the equilibrium manifold for a Bertrand pricing game in which the number of
equilibria changes with the market size. Moreover, we apply these techniques to
two stochastic dynamic games of industry competition and check for equilibrium
uniqueness.
Keywords: Polynomial equations, multiple equilibria, Bertrand game, dynamic
games, Markov-perfect equilibria.
JEL codes: C63, C73, L13.
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1 Introduction
Static and dynamic games are important tools for the analysis of strategic interactions
among economic agents and have found many applications in economics. Such models are
used both for policy experiments as well as for structural estimation studies. It is well-
known that equilibrium multiplicity poses a serious threat to the validity of such analyses.
This threat is particularly acute if not all equilibria of the examined model are known.
Often equilibria can be described as solutions of polynomial equations (which perhaps
also must satisfy some additional inequalities). In this paper we describe state-of-the-art
techniques developed in algebraic geometry for nding all solutions of polynomial systems
of equations and illustrate these techniques by computing all equilibria of both static and
dynamic games with continuous strategies. We compute the equilibrium manifold for a
Bertrand pricing game in which the number of pure-strategy equilibria changes with
the market size. Moreover, we apply these techniques to two stochastic dynamic games
of industry competition and check for equilibrium uniqueness. Our examples show that
the all-solution methods can be applied to a variety of applied static and dynamic models.
Multiplicity of equilibria is a prevalent problem in equilibrium models with strategic
interactions. This problem has long been acknowledged in the theoretical literature but
has in the past been largely ignored in applied work even though simple examples of
multiple equilibria have been known for decades, see, for example, the model of strate-
gic investment in Fudenberg and Tirole (1983a). Until recently this criticism was also
true for one of the most prolic literatures of applied game-theoretic models, namely
the literature based on the framework for the study of industry evolution introduced
by Ericson and Pakes (1995). This framework builds the foundation for very active re-
search areas in industrial organization, marketing, and other elds, see the survey by
Doraszelski and Pakes (2007). Some recent work in this literature is a great example of
the growing interest in equilibrium multiplicity in active areas of modern applied eco-
nomic analysis. Besanko, Doraszelski, Kryukov, and Satterthwaite (2010) state that to
their knowledge \all applications of Ericson and Pakes' (1995) framework have found a
single equilibrium." They then show that multiple Markov-perfect equilibria can easily
arise in a prototypical model in this framework. Borkovsky, Doraszelski, and Kryukov
(2008) and Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (2010) present similar examples with multiple
Markov-perfect equilibria. But ndings of multiple equilibria are not conned to stochas-
tic dynamic models. Bajari, Hong, Krainer, and Nekipelov (2010) show that multiple
equilibria may arise in static games with incomplete information and discuss a possible
approach to estimating such games. Clearly the diculty of equilibrium multiplicity is
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not restricted to the cited papers. In fact, in many other economic applications we may
often suspect that there could be multiple equilibria.
In many economic models equilibria can be described as solutions of polynomial equa-
tions (which perhaps also must satisfy some additional inequalities). Recent advances in
computational algebraic geometry have led to several powerful methods and their easy-
to-use computer implementations that nd all solutions to polynomial systems. Two
dierent solution approaches stand out, all-solution homotopy methods and Grobner
basis methods, both of which have their advantages and disadvantages. The methods
using Grobner bases (Cox, Little, and O'Shea (2007), Sturmfels (2002)) can solve only
rather small systems of polynomial equations but can analyze parameterized systems.
For an application of these methods to economics, see the analysis of parameterized gen-
eral equilibrium models in Kubler and Schmedders (2010). The all-solution homotopy
methods (Sommese and Wampler (2005)) are purely numerical methods that cannot han-
dle parameters but can solve much larger systems of polynomial equations. It is these
homotopy methods that are the focus of the present paper.
All-solution homotopy methods for solving polynomial systems derived from economic
models have been discussed previously in both the economics and mathematics literature
on nite games. McKelvey and McLennan (1996) mentions the initial work on the de-
velopment of all-solution homotopy methods such as Drexler (1977), Drexler (1978), and
Garcia and Zangwill (1977). Herings and Peeters (2005) outlines how to use all-solution
homotopies for nding all Nash equilibria of generic nite n-person games in normal form
but neither implements an algorithm nor solves any examples. Sturmfels (2002) surveys
methods for solving polynomial systems of equations and applies them to nding Nash
equilibria of nite games. Datta (2010) shows how to nd all Nash equilibria of nite
games by polyhedral homotopy continuation. Turocy (2008) describes progress on a new
implementation of a polyhedral continuation method via the software package PHCpack
(Verschelde (1999)) in the software package Gambit (McKelvey, McLennan, and Turocy
(2007)). The literature on computing one, some, or all Nash equilibria in nite games
remains very active, see the introduction to a recent symposium by von Stengel (2010)
and the many citations therein. For a recent application of all-solution homotopy ideas
to calculate asymptotic approximations of all equilibria for static discrete games of in-
complete information see Bajari, Hong, Krainer, and Nekipelov (2010). In the present
paper we do not consider nite games but instead analyze static and dynamic games
with continuous strategies. Such games have many important economic applications. To
our knowledge, the present paper is the rst application of state-of-the-art all-solution
homotopy methods to such games. In addition, this paper presents the rst application of
advanced techniques such as the parameter continuation method or the system splitting
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approach to economic models.1
The application of homotopy methods has a long history in economics, see Eaves
and Schmedders (1999). Kalaba and Tesfatsion (1991) proposes an adaptive homotopy
method to allow the continuation parameters to take on complex values to deal with
singular points along the homotopy path. Berry and Pakes (2007) uses a homotopy
approach for the estimation of demand systems. The homotopy approach was rst ap-
plied to stochastic dynamic games by Besanko, Doraszelski, Kryukov, and Satterthwaite
(2010), Borkovsky, Doraszelski, and Kryukov (2008) and Borkovsky, Doraszelski, and
Kryukov (2009). These three papers report results from the application of a classical ho-
motopy approach to the computation of Markov-perfect equilibria in stochastic dynamic
games. They show how homotopy paths can be used to nd multiple equilibria. When
the homotopy parameter is itself a parameter of the economic model then all points
along the path represent economic equilibria (if the equilibrium equations are necessary
and sucient). Whenever the path bends back on itself there exist multiple equilibria.
While this approach can detect equilibrium multiplicity it is not guaranteed to nd all
equilibria. Only the all-solution homotopy techniques presented in this paper allow for
the computation of all equilibria. However, the classical homotopy approach has the ad-
vantage that it can nd (at least) one equilibrium of much larger economic models with
thousands of equations that do not have to be polynomial. Currently available computer
power does not allow us to solve systems with more than a few dozen equations depend-
ing on the degree of the polynomials. As we explain below, however, the all-solution
1In this paper we neither prove any new theorems nor present the most recent examples of frontier
applications. Instead we follow the traditional approach in computational papers and describe a numer-
ical method and apply it to examples that are familiar to most readers. This paper, as many previous
computational papers have done, aims to educate the reader about the key ideas underlying a useful
numerical method and illustrates these techniques in the context of familiar models. It does so in a way
that makes it easy for readers to see how to apply these methods to their own particular problems, and
points them to the appropriate software. To clarify what we mean by \traditional method," we give a
few examples. First, the paper by Kloek and van Dijk (1978) introduced Monte Carlo methods to basic
econometrics using examples from the existing empirical literature and also focused on the methods as
opposed to examining breakthrough applications. Second, Fair and Taylor (1983) showed how to use
Gauss-Jacobi methods to solve rational expectation models. Again, the paper neither presented new
theorems nor used frontier applications as examples. Instead it focused on very simple examples that
made clear the mathematical structure of the algorithm and related it to the standard structure of ratio-
nal expectations models. Third, Pakes and McGuire (2001) showed how to use stochastic approximation
to accelerate the Gauss-Jacobi algorithm that they had previously introduced in Pakes and McGuire
(1994) for the solution of stochastic dynamic games. Again, the paper did not analyze new applications
and proved only one (convergence) theorem. Instead the paper educates the reader about stochastic
ideas and illustrates their value in a well-known example. In this paper we follow the tradition of this
literature.
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homotopy methods are ideally suited for parallel computations. Our initial experience
with an implementation on a computer cluster is very encouraging.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 depicts a motivating
economic example. We both provide some intuition and describe the theoretical foun-
dation for the all-solution homotopy methods in Section 3. Section 4 briey comments
on an implementation of such methods. In Section 5 we provide more details on the
computations for the motivating example. Section 6 provides a description of the general
set-up of dynamic stochastic games. In Section 7 we present an application of the all-
solution methods to a stochastic dynamic learning-by-doing model. Similarly, Section 8
examines a stochastic dynamic model of cost-reducing investment with the all-solution
homotopy. Finally, Section 9 concludes the paper and provides an outlook on future
developments. The Appendix provides more mathematical details on four advanced fea-
tures of all-solution homotopy methods.
2 Motivating Example: Duopoly Game with Two
Equilibria
Before we describe details of all-solution homotopy methods, we motivate the application
of such methods in economics by reporting results from applying such a method to a static
duopoly game. Depending on the value of a parameter, this game may have no, one, or
two pure-strategy equilibria. This example illustrates the various steps that are needed
to nd all pure-strategy Nash equilibria in a simple game with continuous strategies.
2.1 Bertrand price game
We consider a Bertrand price game between two rms. There are two products, x and
y, two rms with rm x (y) producing good x (y), and three types of customers. Let px
(py) be the price of good x (y). Dx1, Dx2, and Dx3 are the demands for product x by
customer type 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Demands Dy1, etc. are similarly dened. Type
1 customers only want good x, and have a linear demand curve,
Dx1 = A  px; Dy1 = 0:
Type 3 customers only want good y and have a linear demand curve,
Dx3 = 0; Dy3 = A  py:
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Type 2 customers want some of both. Let n be the number of type 2 customers. We
assume that the two goods are imperfect substitutes for type 2 customers with a constant
elasticity of substitution between the two goods and a constant elasticity of demand for
a composite good. These assumption imply the demand functions
Dx2 = np x
 
p1 x + p
1 
y
  
 1+ ; Dy2 = np y
 
p1 x + p
1 
y
  
 1+ :
where  is the elasticity of substitution between x and y, and  is the elasticity of
demand for the composite good

q
 1

1 + q
 1

2
 
( 1)
. Total demand for good x (y) is
given by Dx = Dx1 +Dx2 +Dx3 (Dy = Dy1 +Dy2 +Dy3). Let m be the unit cost of
production for each rm. Prot for good x is Rx = (px  m)Dx; Ry is similarly dened.
Let MRx be marginal prots for good x; similarly for MRy. Equilibrium prices satisfy
the necessary conditions MRx = MRy = 0.
Firm x (y) is a monopolist for type 1 (3) customers. The two rms only compete
in the large market for type 2 customers. And so we may envision two dierent pricing
strategies for the rms. The mass market strategy chooses a low price so that the rm
can sell a large quantity to the large number of type 2 customers that would like to
buy both goods but are price sensitive. Such a low price leads to small prots from the
customers dedicated to the rm's product. The niche strategy is to just sell at a high
price to the few customers that want only its good. Such a high price leads to small
demand for its product among the price-sensitive type 2 customers.
We want to demonstrate how we can nd all solutions even when there are multiple
equilibria. The idea of our example is to nd values for the parameters where each rm
has two possible strategies. We examine a case where one rm goes for the high-price,
small-sales (niche) strategy and the other rm goes after type 2 customers with a mass
market strategy. Let
 = 3;  = 2; n = 2700; m = 1; A = 50:
The marginal prot functions are as follows.
MRx = 50  px + (px   1)
 
 1 + 2700
p6x
 
p 2x + p 2y
3=2   8100p4xpp 2x + p 2y
!
+
2700
p3x
p
p 2x + p 2y
MRy = 50  py + (py   1)
 
 1 + 2700
p6y
 
p 2x + p 2y
3=2   8100p4ypp 2x + p 2y
!
+
2700
p3y
p
p 2x + p 2y
2.2 Polynomial equilibrium equations
We rst construct a polynomial system. The system we construct must contain all the
equilibria, but it may have extraneous solutions. The extraneous solutions present no
problem because we can easily identify and discard them.
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We need to eliminate the radical terms. Let Z be the square root term
Z =
q
p 2x + p 2y ;
which implies
0 = Z2   p 2x + p 2y  :
This is not a polynomial. We gather all terms into one fraction and extract the numerator,
which is the polynomial we include in our polynomial system to represent the variable
Z,
0 =  p2x   p2y + Z2p2xp2y: (1)
We next use the Z denition to eliminate radicals in MRx and MRy. Again we gather
terms into one fraction and extract the numerator. The second and third equation of our
polynomial are as follows:
0 =  2700 + 2700px + 8100Z2p2x   5400Z2p3x + 51Z3p6x   2Z3p7x; (2)
0 =  2700 + 2700py + 8100Z2p2y   5400Z2p3y + 51Z3p6y   2Z3p7y: (3)
Any pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is a solution of the polynomial system (1,2,3).
2.3 Solution
Solving the above system of polynomial equations (see Section 5.1 for details) we nd
18 real and 44 complex solutions. Nine of the 18 real solutions contain at least one
variable with a negative value and are thus economically meaningless. Table 1 shows
the remaining 9 solutions. We next check the second-order conditions of each rm. This
px 1.757 8.076 22.987 2.036 5.631 2.168 25.157 7.698 24.259
py 1.757 8.076 22.987 5.631 2.036 25.157 2.168 24.259 7.698
Table 1: Real, positive solutions of (1,2,3)
check eliminates ve more real solutions and reduces the set of possible equilibria to four,
namely  
p1x; p
1
y

= (1:757; 1:757) ;
 
p2x; p
2
y

= (22:987; 22:987) ; 
p3x; p
3
y

= (2:168; 25:157) ;
 
p4x; p
4
y

= (25:157; 2:168) :
We next need to check global optimality for each player in each potential equilibrium.
The key fact is that the global max must satisfy the rst-order conditions given the other
8
player's strategy. So, all we need to do is to nd all solutions to a rm's rst-order
condition at the candidate equilibrium, and then nd which one produces the highest
prots. We keep the candidate equilibrium only if it is the global maximum.
First consider
 
p1x; p
1
y

. We rst check to see if player x's choice is globally optimal
given py. Since we take py as given, the equilibrium system reduces to the Z equation
and the rst-order condition for player x, giving us the polynomial system
0 = 0:32410568484991703p2x + 1  Z2p2x
0 =  2700 + 2700px + 8100Z2p2x   5400Z2p3x + 51Z3p6x   2Z3p7x
This system has 14 nite solutions, 8 complex and 6 real solutions. One of the solutions
is px = 25:2234 where prots equal 607.315. Since this exceeds 504.625, rm x's prots at 
p1x; p
1
y

, we conclude that
 
p1x; p
1
y

is not an equilibrium. A similar approach shows that 
p2x; p
2
y

is not an equilibrium. Given p2y = 22:987, rm x would receive a higher prot
from a low price than from p2x. When we examine the remaining two candidate equilibria,
we nd that these are two asymmetric equilibria,
 
p3x; p
3
y

and
 
p4x; p
4
y

. This may not
appear to be an important multiplicity since the two equilibria are mirror images of each
other. However, it is clear that if we slightly perturb the demand functions to eliminate
the symmetries that there will still be two equilibria that are not mirror images.
In the equilibrium
 
p3x; p
3
y

= (2:168; 25:157), rm x chooses a mass-market strategy
and rm y a niche strategy. The low price allows rm x to capture most of the market of
price-sensitive type 2 customers while it forgoes most of the possible (monopoly) prots
in its niche market of type 1 customers. Firm y instead charges a high price (just below
the monopoly price for the market of type 3 customers) to capture most of its niche
market. In the equilibrium
 
p4x; p
4
y

= (25:157; 2:168) the strategies of the two rms are
reversed.
This example demonstrates that the problem of nding all Nash equilibrium reduces
to solving a series of polynomial systems. The rst system identies a set of solutions for
the rms' rst-order conditions, which are only necessary but not sucient. The second
step is to eliminate all candidate equilibria where some rm does not satisfy the local
second-order condition for optimization. The third step is to check the global optimality
of each rm's reactions in each of the remaining candidate equilibria. This step reduces
to nding all solutions of a set of smaller polynomial systems.
Figure 1 displays the manifold of a rm's equilibrium prices for values of the market
size parameter n between 500 and 3400. For 500  n  2470 there is a unique equilibrium.
The competitive market of type 2 customers is so small that each rm chooses a niche
strategy and charges a high price to focus on the few customers that only want its good.
For 3318  n  3400 there is again a unique equilibrium. The competitive market of type
9
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Figure 1: Equilibrium prices as a function of n
2 customers is now suciently large so that each rm chooses a mass market strategy
and charges a low price to sell a high quantity into the mass market of type 2 customers.
For 2481  n  3020 there are two equilibria. At these intermediate values of n, the two
rms prefer complementary strategies, one rm chooses a (high-price) niche strategy and
the other rm a (low-price) mass market strategy. And nally there are two regions with
no pure-strategy equilibria, namely for 2471  n  2480 and also for 3021  n  3317.
3 All-Solution Homotopy Methods
In this section we introduce the mathematical background of all-solution homotopy meth-
ods for polynomial systems of equations. Polynomial solution methods rely on results
from complex analysis and algebraic geometry. For this purpose we rst review some
basic denitions.
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3.1 Mathematical background
We dene a polynomial in complex variables.
Denition 1. A polynomial f over the variables z1; : : : ; zn is dened as
f(z1; : : : ; zn) =
dX
j=0
 X
d1+:::+dn=j
a(d1;:::;dn)
nY
k=1
zdkk
!
with a(d1;:::;dn) 2 C; d 2 N:
For convenience we denote z = (z1; : : : ; zn). The expression a(d1;:::;dn)
Qn
k=1 z
dk
k for a(d1;:::;dn) 6=
0 is called a term of f . The degree of f is dened as deg f = maxa(d1;:::;dn) 6=0
Pn
k=1 dk.
The term
P
d1+:::+dn=j
a(d1;:::;dn)
Qn
k=1 z
dk
k is called the homogeneous part of degree j of f
and is denoted by f (j).
Note that f (j) being homogeneous of degree j means f (j)(cz) = cjf (j)(z) for any
complex scalar c 2 C. We now regard a polynomial f in the variables z1; : : : ; zn as a
function f : Cn ! C. Then f belongs to the following class of functions.
Denition 2. Let U  Cn be an open subset and f : U ! C a function. Then we call
f analytic at the point b = (b1; : : : ; bn) 2 U if and only if there exists a neighborhood V
of b such that
f(z) =
1X
j=0
 X
d1+:::+dn=j
a(d1;:::;dn)
nY
k=1
(zk   bk)dk
!
; 8z 2 V;
where a(d1;:::;dn) 2 C, i.e. the above power series converges to the function f on V . It is
called the Taylor series of f at b.
Obviously every function given by polynomials is analytic with one Taylor expansion
on all of Cn. However note that in general V $ U and that the power series is divergent
outside of V . For functions in complex space we can state the Implicit Function Theorem
analogously to the case of functions in real space.
Theorem 1 (Implicit Function Theorem). Let
H : C Cn  ! Cn with (t; z1; : : : zn) 7 ! H(t; z1; : : : zn)
be an analytic function. Denote by DzH =

@Hj
@zi

i;j=1;:::n
the submatrix of the Jacobian
of H containing the partial derivatives with respect to zi, i = 1; : : : ; n. Furthermore
let (t0; x0) 2 C  Cn such that H(t0; x0) = 0 and detDzH(t0; x0) 6= 0. Then there
exist neighborhoods T of t0 and A of x0 and an analytic function x : T ! A such that
H(t; x(t)) = 0 for all t 2 T . Furthermore the chain rule implies that
@x
@t
(t0) =  DzH(t0; x0) 1  @H
@t
(t0; x0):
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Next we dene the notion of a path.
Denition 3. Let A  Cn be an open or closed subset. An analytic2 function x : [0; 1]!
A or x : [0; 1)! A is called a path in A.
Denition 4. Let H(t; z) : Cn+1 ! Cn and x : [0; 1] ! Cn an analytic function such
that H(t; x(t)) = 0 for all t. Then x denes a path in f(t; x) 2 Cn+1 j H(t; x) = 0g. We
call the path regular, i ft 2 [0; 1) j H(t; x(t)) = 0; detDzH(t; x(t)) = 0g = ;.3
Note that for general homotopy methods the regularity denition is less strict. One
usually only wants the Jacobian to have full rank. Here we also impose which part of it
has full rank. Such a denition is reasonable for polynomial homotopy methods since, as
we see later, we can ensure this property for our paths.
Denition 5. Let A  Cn. We call A pathwise connected, i for all points a1; a2 2 A
there exists a continuous function x : [0; 1]! A such that x(0) = a1 and x(1) = a2.
Lastly we need the following notion from topology.
Denition 6. Let U; V  Cn be open subsets and h0 : U ! V , h1 : U ! V be continuous
functions. Let
H : [0; 1] U  ! V
(t; z) 7 ! H(t; z)
be a continuous function such that H(0; z) = h0(z) and H(1; z) = h1(z). Then we call
H a homotopy from h0 to h1.
3.2 Building intuition from the univariate case
Homotopy methods have a long history in economics, see Eaves and Schmedders (1999),
for nding one solution to a system of nonlinear equations. Recent applications of such
homotopy methods in game-theoretic models include Besanko, Doraszelski, Kryukov,
and Satterthwaite (2010) and Borkovsky, Doraszelski, and Kryukov (2008). Homotopy
methods for nding all solutions of polynomial systems were rst introduced by Garcia
and Zangwill (1977) and Drexler (1977). These papers initiated an active eld of research
that is still advancing today, see Sommese and Wampler (2005) for an overview. In this
subsection, following Sommese and Wampler (2005) and the many cited works therein,
we provide some intuition for the theoretical foundation underlying all-solution homotopy
continuation methods.
2The usual denition of a path only requires continuity, but all paths we regard are automatically
given by analytic functions.
3We see below why we can exclude t = 1 from our regularity assumption.
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The basic idea of the homotopy approach is to nd an easier system of equations and
continuously transform it into our target system. We rst illustrate this for univariate
polynomials. Consider the univariate polynomial f(z) =
P
id aiz
i with ad 6= 0 and
deg f = d. The Fundamental Theorem of Algebra states that f has precisely d com-
plex roots, counting multiplicities.4 A simple polynomial of degree d with d distinctive
complex roots is g(z) = zd   1, whose roots are rk = e 2ikd for k = 0; : : : ; d   1. (These
roots are called the d-th roots of unity.) Now we can dene a homotopy H from g to f
by setting H = (1   t)g + tf . Thus H is a polynomial in t; z and therefore an analytic
function. Under the assumption that @H
@z
(t; z) 6= 0 for all (t; z) satisfying H(t; z) = 0 and
t 2 [0; 1] the Implicit Function Theorem (Theorem 1) states that each root rk of g gives
rise to a path that is described by an analytical function. The idea is now to start at
each solution z = rk of H(0; z) = 0 and to follow the resulting path until a solution z
of H(1; z) = 0 has been reached. The path-following can be done numerically using a
predictor-corrector method (see, for example, Allgower and Georg (2003)). For example,
Euler's method is a so-called rst-order predictor and obtains a rst step along the path
by choosing an " > 0 and calculating
~xk(0 + ") = xk(0) + "
@xk
@t
(0);
where the @xk
@t
(0) are implicitly given by Theorem 1. Then this rst estimate is corrected
using Newton's method with starting point ~xk(0+ "). So the method solves the equation
H("; z) = 0 for z and sets xk(") = z.
Example 1. As a rst example we look at the polynomial f(z) = z3 + z2 + z + 1.
The zeros are f 1; i; ig. As a start polynomial we choose g(z) = z3   1. We dene a
homotopy from g to f as follows,
H(t; z) = (1  t)(z3   1) + t(z3 + z2 + z + 1):
This homotopy generates the three solution paths shown in Figure 2. The starting points
of the three paths,  1
2
 
p
3
2
i;  1
2
+
p
3
2
i; 1; respectively, and are indicated by circles. The
respective end points,  i, i, and  1 are indicated by squares.
This admittedly rough outline captures the fundamental idea of the all-solution ho-
motopy methods. This method can potentially run into diculties. First, the paths
might cross and, secondly, the paths might bend sideways and diverge. We illustrate
these problems with an example and also show how to circumvent them.
4Any univariate polynomial of degree d over the complex numbers can be written as f(z) = c(z  
b1)
r1(z   b2)r2    (z   bl)rl with c 2 C n f0g, b1; b2; : : : ; bl 2 C, and r1; r2; : : : ; rl 2 N. The exponent rj
denotes the multiplicity of the root bj . For example, the polynomial z
3 has the single root z = 0 with
multiplicity 3.
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Figure 2: Homotopy paths in Example 1 and the projection to C.
Example 2. Let f(z) = 5  z2 and g(z) = z2  1: Then a homotopy from g to f can be
dened as
H(t; z) = t(5  z2) + (1  t)(z2   1) = (1  2t)z2 + 6t  1: (4)
Now H(1
6
; z) = 2
3
z2 has the double root z = 0, so detDzH(
1
6
; 0) = 0. Such points
are called non-regular and the assumption of the Implicit Function Theorem is not satis-
ed. Non-regular points are also problematic for the Newton corrector step in the path-
following algorithm. But matters are even worse for this homotopy since H(1
2
; z) = 2;
which has no zero at all, i.e. there can be no solution path from t = 0 to t = 1. The
coecient of the leading term (1 2t)z2 has become 0 and so the degree of the polynomial
H drops at t = 1
2
. Figure 3 displays the set of zeros of the homotopy. The two paths
starting at
p
5 and  p5 diverge as t! 1
2
.
The general idea to resolve the technical problems illustrated in Example 2 is to
\walk around" the points that cause us trouble. For a description of this idea we need
the following theorem which describes one of the dierences between complex and real
spaces.
Theorem 2. Let F = (f1; : : : ; fk) = 0 be a system of polynomial equations in n variables,
with fi 6= 0 for some i. Then Cn n fF = 0g is a pathwise connected and dense subset of
Cn.5
5This is a simpler version of the theorem that is actually needed. But for simplicity we avoid the
general case.
14
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 −10
−5
0
5
10
real
Paths cross
diverge to infinity
t
imag
−15−10−5051015
−10
−8
−6
−4
−2
0
2
4
6
8
10
Diverges to Infinty
real
Figure 3: Homotopy paths in Example 2 and the projection to C.
This statement does not hold true over the reals. Take for instance n = 2, k = 1 and
set f1(x1; x2) = x1. (Note that f1 is not identically zero.) Now we restrict ourselves to the
real numbers, (x1; x2) 2 R2. If we remove the zero set f(x1; x2) 2 R2 : f1(x1; x2) = 0g,
which is the vertical axis, then the resulting set R2 n f(x1; x2) 2 R2 j x1 = 0g consists of
two disjoint components. Thus it is not pathwise connected.
Example 3. Returning to Example 2 we temporarily regard t also as a complex variable
and thus f(t; z)jH(t; z) = 0g  C2. Due to Theorem 1 we only have a path if locally
the determinant is nonzero. The points that are not regular are characterized by the
equations
(1  2t)z2 + 6t  1 = 0
detDzH = 2z(1  2t) = 0:
(5)
Points at which our path is interrupted are given by
1  2t = 0: (6)
In this case we can easily determine that the only solution to (5) is (1
6
; 0) and the solution
to (6) is ft = 1
2
g. The union of the solution sets to the two equations is exactly the
solution set of the following system of equations
((1  2t)z2 + 6t  1)(1  2t) = 0
(2z(1  2t))(1  2t) = 0:
(7)
Theorem 2 now implies that the complement of the solution set to system (7) is pathwise
connected. In other words, we can nd a path between any two points without running
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Figure 4: Homotopy paths in Example 3 after application of the gamma trick.
into problematic points. To walk around those problematic points we dene a new
homotopy by multiplying the start polynomial z2   1 by ei for a random  2 [0; 2):
H(t; z) = t(5  z2) + ei(1  t)(z2   1) = (ei   t  tei)z2 + tei   ei + 5t: (8)
Now we obtain DzH = 2(e
i  t  tei)z which has z = 0 as its only solution if ei =2 R
and t 2 [0; 1]. Furthermore if ei =2 R then H(t; 0) = tei   ei + 5t 6= 0 for all t 2 [0; 1].
Additionally the coecient of z2 in (8) does not vanish for t 2 R and thus H(t; x) = 0 has
always two solutions for t 2 [0; 1] due to the Fundamental Theorem of Algebra. Therefore
this so-called gamma trick yields only paths that are not interrupted and are regular.
Figure 4 displays the two paths; the left graph shows the paths in three dimensions, the
right graph shows a projection of the paths on C. It remains to check how strict the
condition ei =2 R is. We know ei 2 R ,  = k for k 2 N. Since  2 [0; 2) these are
only two points. Thus for a random  the paths exist and are regular with probability
one.
This example concludes our introductory discussion of the all-solution homotopy ap-
proach. In the next subsection we describe technical details of the general multivariate
homotopy approach. A reader who is mainly interested in the quick implementation of
homotopies as well as economic applications may want to skip this part and continue
with Section 4.
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3.3 The multivariate case
When we attempt to generalize the outlined approach from the univariate to the multi-
variate case we encounter a signicant diculty. The Fundamental Theorem of Algebra
does not generalize to multiple equations and so we do not know a priori the number
of complex solutions. However, we can determine upper bounds on the number of solu-
tions. For the sake of our discussion in this paper it suces to introduce the simplest
such bound.
Denition 7. Let F = (f1; : : : fn) : Cn ! Cn be a polynomial function. Then the
number
d =
Y
i
deg fi
is called the total degree or Bezout number of F .
Theorem 3 (Bezout's Theorem). Let d be the Bezout number of F . Then the polynomial
system F = 0 has at most d isolated solutions counting multiplicities.
This bound is tight, in fact, Garca and Li (1980) show that generic polynomial
systems have exactly d distinct isolated solutions. But this result does not provide any
guidance for specic systems, since systems arising in economics and other applications
will typically be so special that the number of solutions is much smaller.
Next we address the diculties we observed in Example 2 for the multivariate case.
Consider a square polynomial system F = (f1; : : : ; fn) = 0 with di = deg fi. Construct a
start system G = (g1; : : : ; gn) = 0 such that
gi(z) = z
di
i   1: (9)
Note that the polynomial gi(z) only depends on the variable zi and has the same degree as
fi(z). The polynomial functions F and G have the same Bezout number. Now construct a
homotopy H = (h1; : : : ; hn) : CCn ! Cn from the square polynomial system F (z) = 0
and the start system G(z) = 0 that is linear in the homotopy parameter t. As a result
hi(z) is a polynomial of degree di in the variables z1; : : : ; zn and coecients that are linear
functions in t,
hi(z) =
diX
j=0
 X
c1+:::+cn=j
a(i;c1;:::;cn)(t)
nY
k=1
zckk
!
In a slight abuse of notation we denote by ai(t) the product of the coecients of the
highest-degree monomials of hi(z). As before we need to rule out non-regular points
and values of the homotopy parameter for which the system H(t; z) = 0 may have no
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solution. Non-regular points are solutions to the following system of equations.
hi = 0 8i
detDzH = 0:
(10)
Additionally, values of the homotopy parameter for which one or more of our paths might
get interrupted are all t that satisfy the following equation,Y
i
ai(t) = 0: (11)
For a t0 satisfying the above equation it follows that the polynomial H(t0; z) has a lower
Bezout number than F (z).6 Analogously to example 3 we can cast (10) and (11) in one
system of equations,
hi
Y
j
aj(t) = 0 8i
det (DzH)
Y
i
ai(t) = 0:
(12)
Theorem 2 states that the complement of the solution set to this system of equations is
a pathwise connected set. So as before we can \walk around" those points that cause
diculties for the path-following algorithm. In fact, if we choose our paths randomly
just as in Example 3 then we do not encounter those problematic points with probability
one.
Theorem 4 (Gamma trick). Let G(z) : Cn ! Cn be our start system and F (z) :
Cn ! Cn our target system. Then for almost all7 choices of the constant  2 [0; 2) the
homotopy
H(t; z) = ei(1  t)G(z) + tF (z) (13)
has regular solution paths and jfz j H(t1; z) = 0gj = jfz j H(t2; z) = 0gj for all t1; t2 2
[0; 1).
We say that a path diverges to innity at t = 1 if kz(t)k ! 1 for z(t) satisfying
H(t; z(t)) = 0 as t! 1 where k  k denotes the Euclidean norm. The Gamma trick leads
to the following theorem.
Theorem 5. Consider the homotopy H as in (13) with a start system as in (9). For
almost all parameters  2 [0; 2), the following properties hold.
6Note that after homogenization, which we introduce in Section A, this no longer poses any problem.
7Throughout this paper the terminology \almost all" means an open set of measure one. All stated
results in fact hold on so-called Zariski-open sets, but for simplicity we omit a proper denition of this
term.
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1. The preimage H 1(0) consists of d regular paths, i.e. no paths cross or bend back-
wards.
2. Each path either diverges to innity or converges to a solution of F (z) = 0 as
t! 1.
3. If z is an isolated solution with multiplicity8 m, then there are m paths converging
to it.
By construction the easy system G(z) = 0 has exactly d isolated solutions. Each
of these solutions is the starting point of a smooth path along which the parameter t
increases monotonically, that is, the Jacobian has full rank and the path does not bend
backwards. To nd all solutions of F (z) = 0 we need to follow all d paths and check
whether they diverge or run into a solution of our system. In light of the aforementioned
result by Garca and Li (1980) that generic polynomial systems F (z) = 0 have d isolated
solutions, Theorem 5 implies that the homotopy H gives rise to d distinct paths that
terminate at the d isolated roots of F . So, generically the intuition of the univariate case
carries over to the multivariate case.
3.4 Advanced features
The described method is intuitive but has two major drawbacks that make it impractical.
First, the paths diverging to innity are of no interest in economic applications. Second,
the number of paths grows exponentially in the number of nonlinear equations. A prac-
tical homotopy method needs to spend as little time as possible on diverging paths. In
addition, it will always be advantageous to keep the number of paths as small as possible.
Advanced all-solution homotopy methods address both these problems. In the appendix
we describe the underlying mathematical approaches.
The diverging paths are of no interest for nding economically meaningful solutions
to systems of equations derived from an economic model. The diverging paths typically
require much more computational eort than converging paths. And their potential
presence requires a computer program following the paths to decide whether a path
is diverging or only very long but converging. The decision when to declare that a
path is diverging cannot be made without the risk of actually truncating a very long
converging path. A reliable and robust computational method thus needs some feature
to handle diverging paths. It is possible to \compactify" the diverging path through a
homogenization of the polynomials. Appendix A describes this approach.
8Multiplicity of a root for a system of polynomial equations is similar to multiplicity in the univariate
case. We forgo any proper denition for the sake of simplicity.
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The number of paths d grows rapidly with the degree of individual equations. It
also grows exponentially in the number of equations (if the equations are not linear). For
many economic models we believe that there are only a few (if not unique) equilibria, that
is, our systems have few real solutions and usually even fewer economically meaningful
solutions. As a result we may have to follow a large number of paths that do not yield
useful solutions. Also, if there are only a few real and complex solutions then many paths
must converge to solutions at innity. There may even be continua of solutions at innity
which can cause numerical diculties, see Example 4 in Appendix A below. Therefore
it would be very helpful to reduce the number of paths that must be followed as much
as possible. Appendices B and C describe two methods for a reduction of the number of
paths.
4 Implementation
We briey describe the software package Bertini and the potential computational gains
from a parallel version of the software code.
4.1 Bertini
The software package Bertini, written in the programming language C, oers solvers for
a few dierent types of problems in numerical algebraic geometry, see Bates, Hauenstein,
Sommese, and Wampler (2005). The most important feature for our purpose is Bertini's
homotopy continuation routine for nding all isolated solutions of a square system of
polynomial equations. In addition to an implementation of the advanced homotopy of
Theorem 7 (see Appendix A) it also allows for m-homogeneous start systems as well as
parameter-continuation homotopies as in Theorem 8, see Appendices B and C. Bertini
has an intuitive interface which allows the user to quickly implement systems of polyno-
mial equations, see Sections 5.1 and 5.2 for examples of code that a user must supply.
Bertini can be downloaded free of charge under http://www.nd.edu/~sommese/bertini/
.
All results in this paper were computed with Bertini on a laptop, namely an Intel
Core 2 Duo T9550 with 2.66 GHz and 4GB RAM.
4.2 Alternatives
Two other all-solution homotopy software packages are PHCpack (Verschelde (1999))
written in ADA and POLSYS PLP (Wise, Sommese, and Watson (2000)) written in
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FORTRAN90 and which is intended to be used in conjunction with HOMPACK90 (Wat-
son, Sosonkina, Melville, Morgan, and Walker (1997)), a popular homotopy path solver.
Because of its versatility, stable implementation, great potential for parallelization on
large computer clusters and its friendly user interface we use Bertini for all our calcula-
tions.
4.3 Parallelization
The overall complexity of the all-solution homotopy method is the same as for other
methods used for polynomial system solving. The major advantage of this method,
however, is that it is naturally parallelizable. Following each path is a distinct task,
i.e. the paths can be tracked independently from each other. Moreover, the information
gathered during the tracking process of a path cannot be used to help track other paths.
This advantage coincides with the recent developments in processing technology. The
performance of a single processor will no longer grow as in the years before, since power
consumption and the core temperature have become big issues in the production of
computer chips. The new strategy of computer manufactures is to use multiple cores
within a single machine to spread out the workload.
The software package Bertini is available in a parallel version. As of this writing,
we have already successfully computed examples via parallelization on 200 processors
at the CSCS cluster (Swiss Scientic Computing Center). In order to spread the work
across many more processors a modest revision of the Bertini code is necessary. We are
optimistic that we will soon be able to solve problems on clusters with thousands of
processors. Such a set-up will allow us to solve problems that are orders of magnitude
larger than those described below.
5 Bertrand Price Game Continued
We return to the duopoly price game from Section 2. We now show how to solve the
problem with Bertini. We also show how to use some of the advanced features from
Appendices A{C.
5.1 Solving the Bertrand price game with Bertini
To solve the system (1,2,3) in Bertini we write the following input le:
CONFIG
MPTYPE: 0;
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END;
INPUT
variable_group px,py,z;
function f1, f2, f3;
f1 = -(px^2)-py^2+z^2*px^2*py^2;
f2 = -(2700)+2700*px+8100*z^2*px^2-5400*z^2*px^3+51*z^3*px^6-2*z^3*px^7;
f3 = -(2700)+2700*py+8100*z^2*py^2-5400*z^2*py^3+51*z^3*py^6-2*z^3*py^7;
END;
The option MPTYPE:0 indicates that we are using standard path-tracking. The polyno-
mials f1,f2,f3 dene the system of equations. The Bezout number is 61010 = 600.
Thus, Bertini must track 600 paths. With the above code, we obtained 18 real solutions,
44 complex solutions, 270 truncated innite paths and 268 failures.9 In Appendix A we
show that, if we homogenize the above equations, then we have continua of solutions at
innity as illustrated in Example 4. Such solutions are responsible for the large num-
ber of failures since at these solutions the rank of the Jacobian drops. Of course, such
paths with convergence failures represent a serious concern. Fortunately, Bertini oers
the option MPTYPE: 2 for improved convergence. This command instructs Bertini to use
adaptive precision which handles singular solutions much better but needs more compu-
tation time. We then nd the same 18 real and 44 complex solutions as before. But in
contrast to the previous run, we now have 538 truncated innite paths and no failures.
Bertini lists the real solution in the le real_finite_solutions and all nite ones in
finite_solutions.
Next we show how to reduce the number of paths with m-homogenization (see Ap-
pendix B). Replace variable_group px,py,z; by
variable_group px;
variable_group py;
variable_group z;
By separating the variables in the dierent groups, we indicate how to group them for
the m-homogenization. As a result we have only 182 paths to track. However each
new variable group adds another variable to the computations10 and decreases numerical
9In those cases the path tracker failed to converge on a solution at innity. Note that Bertini uses
random numbers to dene the homotopy, so the number of failed paths varies.
10We repeatedly solve square systems of linear equations. Bertini performs this task with conventional
methods with a complexity of roughly 13n
3, where n is the number of variables. Thus increasing the
number of variables by m adds 13 (m
3 + 3m2n+ 3n2m) to the complexity for each iteration of Newton's
method.
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stability. Therefore we always have to consider the problem of reducing the number of
paths versus increasing the number of variables.
A key point to note is that the number of solutions is much smaller than the Bezout
number. The Bezout number of the system (1,2,3) is 600 but there are only 62 nite
solutions. This fact may be surprising in the light of the theorem that says that systems
such as (1,2,3) would generically have 600 nite complex solutions, see Garcia and Li
(1980). However, (1,2,3) is not similar to the generic system since most monomials of
degree 6 are missing from (1), and most monomials of degree 10 are missing from (2,3).
The absence of so many monomials often implies a far smaller number of nite complex
solutions. For many games this fact makes our strategy much more practical than we
would initially think.
Another key point to note is that the all-solution methods can only be applied to
polynomial systems, that is, when all variables have exponents with non-negative integer
values. We cannot apply such a method to equations with irrational exponents. Such
systems would occur in the Bertrand game, for example, if an elasticity were an irrational
number such as . In addition, an important prerequisite for Bertini to be able to
trace all paths is that the Bezout number remains relatively small. The conversion of
systems with rational exponents with large denominators to proper polynomial systems,
however, leads to polynomial systems with large exponents. For example, the conversion
of equations with exponents such as 54321=10000 will lead to very dicult systems that
require tracing a huge number of paths. In addition, such polynomial terms with very
large exponents will likely generate serious and perhaps fatal numerical diculties for
the path tracker. Therefore, we face some practical constraints on the size of the rational
exponents appearing in our economic models.
5.2 Application of parameter continuation
To demonstrate parameter continuation, which we describe in Appendix C, we choose
n as the parameter and vary it from 2700 to 1000. Note that in Bertini the homotopy
parameter goes from 1 to 0. So to do this we dene a homotopy just between those two
values
n = 2700t+ (0:22334546453233 + 0:974739352i)t(1  t) + 1000(1  t):
Thus for t = 1 we have n = 2700 and if t = 0 then n = 1000. The complex number in
the equation is the application of the gamma trick. We also have to provide the solutions
for our start system. We already solved this system. We just rename Bertini's output
le finite_solutions to start which now provides Bertini with the starting points for
the homotopy paths. In addition, we must alter the input le as follows.
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CONFIG
USERHOMOTOPY: 1;
MPTYPE: 0;
END;
INPUT
variable px,py,z;
function f1, f2, f3;
pathvariable t;
parameter n;
n = t*2700 + (0.22334546453233 + 0.974739352*I)*t*(1-t)+(1-t)*1000;
f1 = -(px^2)-py^2+z^2*px^2*py^2;
f2 = -(n)+n*px+3*n*z^2*px^2-2*n*z^2*px^3+51*z^3*px^6-2*z^3*px^7;
f3 = -(n)+n*py+3*n*z^2*py^2-2*n*z^2*py^3+51*z^3*py^6-2*z^3*py^7;
END;
If we run Bertini we obtain 14 real and 48 complex solutions. Note that the number of real
solutions has dropped by 4. Thus if we had not used the gamma trick some of our paths
would have failed. There are only ve positive real solutions. The rst three solutions in
px 3.333 2.247 3.613 2.045 24.689
py 2.247 3.333 3.613 2.045 24.689
Table 2: Real, positive solutions for n = 1000
Table 2 fail the second-order conditions for at least one rm. The fourth solution fails
the global-optimality test. Only the last solution in Table 2 is an equilibrium for the
Bertrand game for n = 1000.
5.3 The manifold of real positive solutions
The parameter continuation approach allows us to compare solutions and thus equilibria
for two dierent (vectors of) parameter values q0 and q1 of our economic model. Ideally
we would like to push our analysis even further and, in fact, compute the equilibrium
manifold for all convex combinations sq1 + (1  s)q0 with s 2 [0; 1].
Observe that Theorem 8 in Appendix C requires a path between q0 and q1 of the form
'(s) = eis(s  1) + sq1 + (1  s)q0
with a random  2 [0; 2). Note that for real values q0 and q1 the path '(s) is not real
and so all solutions to F (z; '(s)) = 0 are economically meaningless for s 2 (0; 1). This
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problem would not occur if we could drop the rst term of '(s) and instead use the
convex combination
~'(s) = sq1 + (1  s)q0
in the denition of the parameter continuation homotopy. Now an examination of the
real solutions to F (z; ~'(s)) = 0 would provide us with the equilibrium manifold for all
~'(s) with s 2 [0; 1]. Unfortunately, such an approach does not always work. As we
have seen in the previous section, while the number of isolated nite solutions remains
constant with probability one, the number of real solutions may change. A parameter
continuation homotopy with ~'(s) does not allow for this change.
To illustrate the described diculty, we examine two parameter continuation homo-
topies in Bertini. We vary the parameter n rst from 2700 to 3400 and then from 2700 to
500. Figure 5 displays the positive real solutions as a function of n over the entire range
from 500 to 3400. For a clear view of the dierent portions of the manifold we separate
it into two graphs.
For the rst homotopy the number of positive real, other real, and complex (within
nonzero imaginary part) solutions does not change as n is increased from 2700 to 3400.
Therefore, in this case, the described approach to obtain the manifold of (positive) real
solutions encounters no diculties. Things are quite dierent for the second homotopy
when n is decreased from 2700 to 500. As n approaches 1188.6 the paths for the two
largest production quantities converge and then, when n is decreased further, move into
complex space. The same is true for two paths in the lower graph of Figure 5. Bertini
reports an error message for all four paths and stops tracking them. At n = 1188:6 the
number of real solutions changes from 18 to 14, while the number of (truly) complex
solutions with nonzero imaginary part increases from 44 to 48. A similar change in the
number of real and complex solutions occurs for n = 813:8.
To determine the equilibrium manifold, we need to check the second-order and global
optimality conditions for all positive real solutions. Doing so yields the equilibrium
manifold in Figure 1 in Section 2.
In sum, we observe that a complete characterization of the equilibrium manifold is not
a simple exercise. When we employ the parameter continuation approach with a path of
parameters in real space then we have to allow for the possibility of path-tracking failures
whenever the number of real and complex solution changes. The determination of the
entire manifold of positive real solutions may, therefore, require numerous homotopy
runs. Despite these diculties we believe that the parameter continuation approach is a
very helpful tool for the examination of equilibrium manifolds.
We can continue our analysis for larger values of the market size n. Figure 6 shows
the unique equilibrium price px = py for 3400  n  10000. The market of type 2
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Figure 6: Unique equilibrium for large values of n
customers is so large that both rms choose a mass market strategy and charge a low
price. While the number of equilibria remains constant for large values of n, the number
of real solutions changes twice in the examined region. Recall that there are 18 real
solutions for n = 3400. This number decreases to 16 at about n = 5104:5 and further to
14 at about n = 5140:8.
6 Equilibrium Equations for Dynamic Stochastic Games
In this section we rst briey describe a general set-up of dynamic stochastic games.
Such games date back to Shapley (1953), for a textbook treatment see Filar and Vrieze
(1997). Subsequently we explain how Markov-perfect equilibria (MPE) in these games
can be characterized by nonlinear systems of equations.
6.1 Dynamic stochastic games: general formulation
We consider discrete-time innite-horizon dynamic stochastic games of complete infor-
mation with N players. In period t = 0; 1; 2; : : :, player i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; Ng is characterized
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by its state !i;t 2 
i. The set of possible states, 
i, is nite and without loss of generality
we thus dene 
i = f1; 2; : : : ; !^ig for some number !^i 2 N. The product 
 =
QN
i=1
i is
the state space of the game; the vector !t = (!1;t; !2;t; : : : ; !N;t) 2 
 denotes the state of
the game in period t.
Players choose actions simultaneously. Player i's action in period t is ai;t 2 Ai(!t),
where Ai(!t) is the set of feasible actions for player i in state !t. In many economic
applications of dynamic stochastic games Ai(!t) is a convex subset of RM , M 2 N, and
we adopt this assumption here to employ standard rst-order conditions in the analysis.
We denote the collection of all players' actions in period t by at = (a1;t; a2;t; : : : ; aN;t) and
the collection of all but player i's actions by a i;t = (a1;t; : : : ; ai 1;t; ai+1;t; : : : ; aN;t).
Players' actions aect the probabilities of state-to-state transitions. If the state in
period t is !t and the players choose actions at, then the probability that the state in
period t + 1 is !+ is Pr(!+jat;!t). In many applications the transition probabilities for
player i's state are assumed to depend on player i's actions only and to be independent
of other players' actions and transitions in their states. We follow this custom and
make the same assumption. Denoting the transition probability for player i's state by
Pri ((!
+)i jai;t;!i;t), the transition probability for the state of the game therefore satises
Pr
 
!+jat;!t

=
NY
i=1
Pri
  
!+

i
jai;t;!i;t

:
If the state of the game is !t in period t and the players choose actions at then player
i receives a payo i(at; !t). Players discount future payos using a discount factor
 2 (0; 1). The objective of player i is to maximize the expected net present value of all
its future cash ows,
E
( 1X
t=0
ti(at;!t)
)
:
Economic applications of dynamic stochastic games typically rely on the equilibrium
notion of a pure strategy Markov-perfect equilibrium (MPE). That is, attention is re-
stricted to pure equilibrium strategies that depend only on the current state and are
independent of the history of the game. We can thus drop the time subscript. Player
i's strategy Ai maps each state ! 2 
 into its set of feasible actions Ai(!). The ac-
tions of all other players in state ! prescribed by their respective strategies are denoted
A i(!) = (A1(!); : : : ; Ai 1(!); Ai+1(!; : : : ; AN(!)). Finally, we denote by Vi(!) the ex-
pected net present value of future cash ows to player i if the current state is !. The
mapping Vi : 
! R is player i's value function.
For given Markovian strategies A i of all other players, player i faces a discounted
innite-horizon dynamic programming problem. As Doraszelski and Judd (2008) point
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out, Bellman's principle of optimality implies that the optimal solution for this dynamic
programming problem is again a Markovian strategy Ai. That is, a Markov-perfect equi-
librium remains subgame perfect even without the restriction to Markovian strategies.
The Bellman equation for player i's dynamic programming problem is
Vi(!) = max
a2Ai(!)

i(a;A i(!);!) + E

Vi(!
+)ja;A i(!);!
	
(14)
where the expectation operator E[  j  ] determines the conditional expectation of the
player's continuation values Vi(!
+) which are a function of next period's state !+, which
in turn depends on the players current action a, the other players' actions A i(!), and
the current state !. We denote by
hi(a;A i(!);!;Vi) = i(a;A i(!);!) + E

Vi(!
+)ja;A i(!);!

the maximand in the Bellman equation. Player i's optimal action Ai(!) 2 Ai(!)  RM
in state ! is given by
Ai(!) = arg max
a2Ai(!)
hi(a;A i(!);!;Vi): (15)
For each player i = 1; 2; : : : ; N , equations (14) and (15) yield optimality conditions on
the unknowns Vi(!) and Ai(!) in each state ! 2 
. A Markov-perfect equilibrium (in
pure strategies) is now a simultaneous solution to equations (14) and (15) for all players
and states.
6.2 Equilibrium conditions
Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (2010) develop sucient conditions for the existence of a
Markov-perfect equilibrium for a class of dynamic stochastic games. A slightly modied
version of the existence result in their Proposition 2 holds in the described model under
the assumptions that both actions and payos are bounded and the maximand function
hi(; A i(!);!;Vi) is strictly concave for all ! 2 
, other players ' strategies A i, and
value functions Vi satisfying the Bellman equation. Under these assumptions the max-
imand hi(; A i(!);!;Vi) has a unique maximizer Ai(!). This unique maximizer could
lie on the boundary of or be an interior solution of the set of feasible actions Ai(!). (As
Vi changes so will the maximizer and there could be several consistent solutions and thus
equilibria.)
For the purpose of this paper we restrict attention to models that satisfy two further
assumptions which are frequently made in economic applications. First, the function
hi(; A i(!);!;Vi) is continuously dierentiable. Second, we assume that the maximizer
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in equation (15) is always an interior solution. Under these assumptions we can equiva-
lently characterize players' optimality conditions (14) and (15) by a set of necessary and
sucient rst-order conditions.
0 =
@
@a
fi(a;A i(!);!) + E [Vi(!+)ja;A i(!);!]g

a=Ai(!)
(16)
Vi(!) = i(a;A i(!);!) + E [Vi(!+)ja;A i(!);!]

a=Ai(!)
(17)
Thus we have M + 1 equations for each state ! 2 
 and for each player i = 1; 2; : : : ; N .
Any simultaneous solution of pure strategiesA1(!); : : : ; AN(!) and values V1(!); : : : ; VN(!)
for all states ! 2 
 yields an MPE.
If the payo functions i and the probability functions Pr(!
+j;!) are rational func-
tions then the nonlinear equilibrium equations can be transformed into a polynomial
system of equations. In the next two sections we examine two economic models that
satisfy these assumptions.
7 Learning Curve
In many industries the marginal cost of production decreases with the cumulative output,
this eect is often called learning-by-doing. The impact of learning-by-doing on market
equilibrium has been studied in the industrial organization literature for decades. Early
work in this area includes Spence (1981) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1983b). Besanko,
Doraszelski, Kryukov, and Satterthwaite (2010) analyze learning-by-doing and organiza-
tional forgetting within the framework of Ericson and Pakes (1995).
In this section we examine a basic learning-by-doing model in the Ericson and Pakes
(1995) framework. Although the functional forms for the price functions and transition
probabilities are not polynomial we can derive a system of polynomial equations such
that all positive real solutions of this system are Markov-perfect equilibria.
7.1 A learning-by-doing model
There are N = 2 rms and two goods. Firm i produces good i, i = 1; 2. The output of
rm i is denoted by qi which is the rm's only action. (In the language of our general
formulation, ai = qi.) The state variable !i for rm i is a parameter in the rm's
production cost function ci(qi;!i). In our numerical example we assume ci(qi;!i) = !iqi
implying that the state !i is rm i's unit cost of production. For simplicity we assume
w.l.o.g. that !i 2 
i = f1; 2; : : : ; !^ig.
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In each period the two rms engage in Cournot competition. Customers' utility
function over the two goods (and money M) is
u (q1; q2) = w

   1

q
 1

1 + q
 1

2
 ( 1)
( 1)
+M
where  is the elasticity of substitution between goods 1 and 2,  is the elasticity of
demand for the composite good

q
 1

1 + q
 1

2
 
( 1)
, and w is a weighting factor. The
resulting market clearing prices for the two goods are then
P1(q1; q2) = wq
  1

1

q
 1

1 + q
 1

2
  
( 1)
; P2(q1; q2) = wq
  1

2

q
 1

1 + q
 1

2
  
( 1)
;
where Pi(q1; q2) =
@
@qi
u(q1; q2) denotes the price of good i if sales of the two goods are
(q1; q2). And so, if the two rms produce the quantities (q1; q2) in state ! = (!1; !2),
their resulting payos are
i(qi; q i;!) = Pi(q1; q2)qi   ci(qi;!i): (18)
Note that in this model rm i's payo does not explicitly depend on the other rm's
state but only implicitly via the other rm's production quantity.
The dynamic aspect of the model arises from changes in the unit cost !i. Through
learning-by-doing the rms can reduce their unit cost. In our numerical example we use
the popular functional form (see Pakes and McGuire (1994), Borkovsky, Doraszelski, and
Kryukov (2009), and many other papers) for the transition probabilities
Pri[!i   1jqi;!i] = Fqi
1 + Fqi
; Pri[!ijqi;!i] = 1
1 + Fqi
; 0 otherwise (19)
with some constant F > 0 for !i  2. The lowest-cost state !i = 1 is an absorbing
state. Note that outside the absorbing state the higher a rm's production quantity the
higher its probability to move to the next lower cost state. We assume that the transition
probability functions are independent across rms.
Substituting the expressions (18) and (19) into the equilibrium equations (16) and
(17) yields a system of equilibrium equations for the learning-by-doing model. This
system has 4 equations for each state ! = (!1; !2) and thus a total of 4j!^1jj!^2j equations
and unknowns.
Solving the system of equations is greatly simplied by the observation that the nature
of the transitions in this model induces a partial order on the state space 
. The unit cost
!i can only decrease but never increase during the course of the game. Instead of solving
one large system of equations we can successively solve systems of 4 equations state by
state. For the lowest-cost state (1; 1) we only need to nd the static Cournot equilibrium
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and calculate the values Vi(1; 1). Next we can successively solve the systems for the
states (!1; 1) with !1 = 2; 3; : : : ; !^1 and for the states (1; !2) with !2 = 2; 3; : : : ; !^2.
Next we can do the same for all (!1; 2) with !1 = 2; 3; : : : ; !^1, for all nodes (2; !2) with
!2 = 3; : : : ; !^1 and so on. For symmetric games we can further reduce the workload. We
only need to solve system of equations for the states (!1; !2) with !2  !1, that is, for
(1; 1), (!1; 2) for !1 = 2; 3; : : : ; !^1, (!1; 3) for !1 = 3; : : : ; !^1, and so on.
7.2 Solving the equilibrium equations with Bertini
We compute Markov-perfect equilibria for the learning-by-doing game for the following
parameter values. We consider a utility function with  = 2,  = 3=2, and w = 100=3.
The parameter for the transition probability function is F = 1=5. The rms use the
discount factor  = 0:95. We only examine symmetric cases with 
1 = 
2.
Similar to the static game in Section 5, the equilibrium equations in this model contain
fractions and radical terms. The transformation of the equations into polynomial form
forces us to introduce auxiliary variables Q1; Q2; Q3 that are dened as follows,
Q21 = q1; Q
2
2 = q2; Q
2
3 = Q1 +Q2:
The introduction of these new variables enables us to eliminate the value function terms
Vi(q1; q2) of both rms. For each state (!1; !2) we obtain a system of ve equations in
the ve unknowns q1; q2; Q1; Q2; Q3. There is a multiple root at 0. To remove it we add
another variable t and a normalization equation tQ1  1 = 0, thereby obtaining a system
with six variables and six equations.
We solve four dierent types of polynomial systems. First, we solve the system of the
absorbing state (1; 1). The monomials with the highest degrees of the six equations are
tQ1; Q
3
3; Q
2
1; Q
2
2;  Q1Q3(Q1 +Q2);  Q2Q3(Q1 +Q2);
respectively, resulting in a Bezout number of 23  33 = 216. Using m-homogeneity the
number of paths to track reduces to 44. Bertini tracks these 44 paths in just under 4
seconds.
Next we solve the equations for the states (1; !2) for !2  2. The highest degree
terms of the six equations are
tQ1; Q
3
3; Q
2
1; Q
2
2;  Q1Q3(Q1 +Q2); (9F 2!2)Q1Q2Q3q22 + (9F 2!2)Q22Q3q22;
respectively, resulting in a Bezout number of 23  32  5 = 360. Thanks to m-homogeneity
we need to track 140 paths and this takes us with Bertini about 1 minute for each !2.
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Then we solve the equations for state (2; 2), where the highest-degree terms are
tQ1; Q
3
3; Q
2
1; Q
2
2; (9F
4!1)Q
2
1Q3q
2
1q
2
2 + (9F
4!1)Q1Q2Q3q
2
1q
2
2;
(9F 4!2)Q1Q2Q3q
2
1q
2
2 + (9F
4!2)Q
2
2Q3q
2
1q
2
2:
So the Bezout number is 23  3  72 = 1176. Exploiting m-homogeneity we have to track
364 paths which takes about 5 minutes. There are 152 real and complex (nite) solutions.
For the remaining states we can now use parameter continuation since the degree
structure of the systems is identical to that of the equations for state (2; 2). The Bezout
number remains the same as for state (2; 2), but now we only have to track 152 paths
since that was the number of solutions to the system at (2; 2). (To check whether 152
is indeed the maximal number k of isolated nite solutions as in Theorem 8 we solve
a few systems with randomly chosen coecients but the same degree structure. In all
cases there are 152 isolated nite solutions.) Tracking these 152 paths takes about 25
seconds for each state. Again we observe that tracking paths ending at nite solutions
takes much less time than tracking paths that end at points at innity. The reason is
again that some of the solutions at innity lie within continua of solutions and thus cause
numerical diculties.
We solved instances of the described learning-by-doing model with many states for
each rm. We wrote a C++ script that solved the problem by backwards induction by
calling Bertini at each state.11 To keep the presentation of the results manageable we
report here the results for a symmetric game with !^1 = 5. In all our systems there was
a unique real positive solution for all variables. Therefore, we found a unique Markov-
perfect equilibrium for the learning-by-doing model. Table 3 reports the production
quantities q1 and the values of the value function V1 of rm 1. For example, in state
(!1; !2) = (3; 4) rm 1 produces q1 = 11:385 and the game has a value of V1 = 982 for
the rm. By symmetry the corresponding values for rm 2 are (q2; V2) = (8:620; 913).
!1 n !2 5 4 3 2 1
5 7.202 874 7.108 861 7.009 851 6.889 843 6.626 838
4 8.850 939 8.748 925 8.620 913 8.464 905 8.137 899
3 11.475 996 11.385 982 11.233 969 11.016 959 10.573 953
2 16.921 1042 16.840 1027 16.699 1014 16.401 1003 15.714 997
1 38.228 1072 38.171 1057 38.056 1043 37.773 1032 36.600 1025
Table 3: Production quantities q1 and value function V1 of rm 1
11The script is available on http://www.business.uzh.ch/professorships/qba/publications/Software.html.
33
Table 4 reports running times on a laptop (Intel Core 2 Duo T9550 with 2.66 GHz
and 4GB RAM) for the learning-by-doing model. The running times grow approximately
!^1 = !^2 3 5 7 10
time (sec) 477 745 1359 2852
Table 4: Running Times
linearly in the number of states !^1  !^2 and so we could easily solve games with many
more states per rm.
8 Cost-Reducing Investment and Depreciation
In models of cost-reducing investment, spending on investment reduces future produc-
tion cost, see, for example, Flaherty (1980) and Spence (1984). In models of irreversible
investment, current investment spending increases future production capacity, see Fu-
denberg and Tirole (1983a). Besanko and Doraszelski (2004) presents a model with both
capacity investments and depreciation within the Ericson and Pakes (1995) framework.
Depreciation tends to oset investment. In this section we describe a stochastic dynamic
game model in which the marginal cost of production may decrease through investment
or increase through depreciation.
8.1 A cost-reducing investment model
The model of Cournot competition is the same as in the learning-by-doing model with
the only exception that a rm's production quantity does not aect its unit cost. The
dynamic aspect of the model arises again from changes in the unit cost !i. Both increases
and decreases of the unit cost are possible. Firms may be hit by a depreciation shock
resulting in a cost increase but they can also make a cost-reducing investment. A depre-
ciation shock increases the unit cost from !i to !i + 1 and has probability  > 0. If rm
i makes a cost-reducing investment yi at a cost cri(yi) then it achieves a probabilistic
reduction of its cost state. In our numerical examples we assume a quadratic investment
cost function, cri(y) = Diy
2. Total per-period payo is then the dierence of the Cournot
prot and the investment cost,
i(qi; yi; q i; y i;!) = Ci (qi; q i;!)  cri(yi) = Pi(q1; q2)qi   ci(qi;!i) Diy2i :
We assume a transition function of the form (19) with the investment level yi replacing
the Cournot quantity. Assuming independence of the depreciation probabilities and
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the investment transition function then results in the transition probabilities (see also
Besanko and Doraszelski (2004))
Pri[!i   1jyi;!i] = Fyi1+Fyi (1  ) for 2  !i  !^i (20)
Pri[!i + 1jyi;!i] = 11+Fyi  for 1  !i  !^i   1(21)
Pri[!ijyi;!i] = 1  Pri[!i   1jyi;!i]  Pri[!i + 1jyi;!i] for 2  !i  !^i   1(22)
The remaining transition probabilities are
Pri[1jyi; 1] = 1  Pri[2jyi; 1] (23)
Pri[!^ijyi; !^i] = 1  Pri[!^i   1jyi; !^i] (24)
Substituting the expressions for payos and transition probabilities into the equilib-
rium equations (16) and (17) yields a system of equilibrium equations for the model. The
static Cournot game played in each period does not aect the transition probabilities and
so we can solve the two equations at each state that are derived from dierentiating with
respect to the production quantities q1 and q2 independently from the remaining equa-
tions. The remaining system consists of 4 equations for each state ! = (!1; !2) and thus
has a total of 4j!^1jj!^2j equations and unknowns. The degree of each equation is 4.
8.2 Solving the equilibrium equations with Bertini
Since the unit cost !i may increase or decrease we cannot solve the equations state by
state as in the learning-by-doing model. Instead we need to solve a single system of
equations.12
8.2.1 Two states for each rm
We describe the solution of the cost-reducing investment game with depreciation for the
following parameter values,  = 0:95; D1 = D2 = 1; F = 0:2;  = 0:1. The parameters
for the utility functions are again  = 2,  = 3=2, and w = 100=3. Each rm can be in
one of two states. We set 
1 = 
2 = f1; 5g (in a slight abuse of previous notation).
We rst solve the Cournot game for each state. The production quantities of rm 1
are
q1(5; 5) = 3:2736; q1(5; 1) = 2:4664; q1(1; 5) = 38:224; q1(1; 1) = 36:600:
For this model with 2  2 = 4 states there are 16 equations and variables. The
resulting Bezout number is 416 = 4; 294; 967; 296. By utilizing symmetry we simplied
12We perform all calculations and derive the nal system in Mathematica. The Mathematica le is
available on http://www.business.uzh.ch/professorships/qba/publications/Software.html.
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our problem to 8 equations and variables with a total Bezout number of 48 = 65; 536.
Utilizing m-homogeneity we reduce the number of paths to 3328. It took us 1 hour 40
minutes to solve this problem. We found a total of 589 nite, i.e. complex and real,
solutions that lie in ane space, 44 of which are real. We had no path failures, when
using adaptive precision.13 Only one of those real solutions is economically relevant. The
investment levels of rm 1 are
y1(5; 5) = 3:306; y1(5; 1) = 3:223; y1(1; 5) = 0:763; y1(1; 1) = 0:736;
resulting in the following values of the value function,
V1(5; 5) = 816:313; V1(5; 1) = 794:329; V1(1; 5) = 926:059; V1(1; 1) = 895:570:
8.2.2 Three states for each rm
We choose 
1 = 
2 = f1; 5; 10g and our other parameters as in the two-state case. The
production quantities of rm 1 in the additional high-cost states are q1(10; 10) = 1:1574
and
q1(10; 5) = 1:0648; q1(10; 1) = 0:70015; q1(5; 10) = 3:3975; q1(1; 10) = 37:915:
Solving the system of equilibrium equations for the three-state model now poses signi-
cantly more problems than the two-state case. The initial system has 36 equations and
unknowns. The Bezout number is 436  4:72  1021. After exploiting symmetry and using
some algebraic operations to simplify some equations we obtain a system that has 21
equations and unknowns. Its Bezout number is 1; 528; 823; 808. This system, however,
is still unsolvable on a single laptop if we use the standard homotopy approach. For
this reason we now apply the splitting approach from Appendix D. We split the system
into two subsystems which are both small enough to be solvable. In our example the
rst system has M1 = 358 nonsingular solutions. The second system has M2 = 4510
nonsingular solutions. Therefore, if we focus only on the nonsingular solutions we have
358  4510 = 1; 614; 580 paths to track when we combine the two subsystems via a pa-
rameter continuation homotopy. Note that this is an order of magnitude smaller than
taken the system as a whole. We obtain a unique nonsingular equilibrium, see Table 5.
The time to solve this on a single core is over a week.14
13If we do not use adaptive precision we can nish computations in just under 3 minutes. However,
then 396 paths fail to converge. Nevertheless we still obtain all nite solutions. Clearly, if we could
prove that all equilibria are regular solutions to the polynomial system of equilibrium equations then
we could relax the precision parameters in Bertini and thus signicantly reduce both the computational
eort and running times.
14The les are available on http://www.business.uzh.ch/professorships/qba/publications/Software.html.
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!1 n !2 10 5 1
10 3.42 705.00 3.31 680.31 3.24 663.01
5 3.78 820.36 3.70 789.73 3.62 765.53
1 0.86 945.48 0.83 911.76 0.80 878.89
Table 5: Equilibrium investment levels y1 and value function V1
9 Conclusion
We summarize the paper and discuss the current limitations of all-solution methods.
9.1 Summary
This paper describes state-of-the-art techniques for nding all solutions of polynomial
systems of equations and illustrates these techniques by computing all equilibria of both
static and dynamic games with continuous strategies. The requirement of polynomial
equations may, at rst, appear very restrictive. In our rst application, a static Bertrand
pricing game, we show how certain types of non-polynomial equilibrium conditions can be
transformed into polynomial equations. We also show how with repeated application of
the polynomial techniques we can deal with rst-order conditions that are necessary but
not sucient. Finally, this example also depicts the power of the parameter-continuation
homotopy approach. This approach greatly reduces the number of homotopy paths that
need to be traced and, therefore, increases the size of models that we can analyze. When
handled carefully, it even allows us to trace out the equilibrium manifold.
We also apply the all-solution techniques to two stochastic dynamic games of in-
dustry competition and check for equilibrium uniqueness. In the rst application, a
learning-by-doing model of industry competition, the equilibrium system separates into
many small systems of equations which can be solved sequentially. As a result we can
solve specications of this model with many states. In our second application, a model
with cost-reducing investment and cost-increasing depreciation, such a separation of the
equilibrium system is impossible. Solving the resulting equilibrium system requires the
tracing of a huge number of paths. On a single laptop we can solve specications of the
model with only a small number of states.
9.2 Current Limitations and Future Work
For stochastic dynamic games, the number of equations grows exponentially in the num-
ber N of players and polynomially (with degree N) in the number of states. In turn, the
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Bezout number grows exponentially in the number of nonlinear equations. Additionally
the degree of the polynomials is essential which limits the parameter choice for the ex-
ponents in the utility functions. As a result, the number of paths that an all-solution
method must trace grows extremely fast in the size of the economic model. This growth
clearly limits the size of problems we can hope to solve.
Modern policy-relevant models quickly generate systems of polynomial equations with
thousands of equations. For example, the model in Besanko, Doraszelski, Kryukov, and
Satterthwaite (2010) has up to 900 states and 1800 equations. Finding all equilibria of
models of this size is impossible with the computer power available as of the writing of
this paper and it will remain out of reach for the foreseeable future. However, we will
likely be able to solve smaller models such as the dynamic model of capacity accumulation
of Besanko and Doraszelski (2004) with at most 100 states within a few years. Progress
will come on at least three frontiers. First, computer scientists have yet to optimize the
performance of software packages such as Bertini. Second, the all-solution homotopy
methods are ideally suited for parallel computations. Our initial experience has been
very promising. And so, as soon as the existing software will have been adapted to large
parallel computing systems, we will see great progress in the size of the models we can
analyze with the methods described in this paper. And third, methodological advances
such as the equation splitting approach will also help us to solve larger systems.
Appendix
A Homogenization
The all-solution homotopy method presented in Section 3.3 has the unattractive feature
that it must follow diverging paths. Homogenization of the polynomials greatly reduces
the computational eort to track such paths.
Denition 8. The homogenization f^i(z0; z1; : : : ; zn) of the polynomial fi(z1; : : : ; zn) of
degree di is dened by
f^i(z0; z1; : : : ; zn) = z
di
0 fi

z1
z0
; : : : ;
zn
z0

:
Eectively, each term of f^i is obtained from multiplying the corresponding term of fi
by the power of z0 that leads to a new degree of that term of di. So, if the term originally
had degree dij then it is multiplied by z
di dij
0 . Performing this homogenization for each
polynomial fi in the system
F (z1; : : : ; zn) = 0 (25)
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leads to the transformed system
F^ (z0; z1; : : : ; zn) = 0: (26)
For convenience we use the notation z^ = (z0; z1; : : : ; zn) and write F^ (z^) = 0. By con-
struction all polynomials f^i, i = 1; : : : ; n, are homogeneous and so for any solution b^ of
F^ (z^) = 0 it holds that F^ (b^) = 0 for any complex scalar  2 C. So, the solutions to
system (26) are complex lines through the origin in Cn+1.
Denition 9. The n-dimensional complex projective space CP n is the set of lines in
Cn+1 that go through the origin. The space Cn+1 is called the ane space.
A point in projective space CP n corresponds to a line through the origin of the
ane space Cn+1. Let [b^] 2 CP n denote a point in CP n then there is a point b^ =
(b^0; b^1; : : : ; b^n) 2 Cn+1 n f0g that determines this line. We denote the line [b^] by (b^0 : b^1 :
: : : : b^n) to distinguish it from a single point. The notation (z0 : z1 : : : : : zn) is called the
homogeneous coordinates of CP n. Note however that this notation is not unique, we can
take any b^ with  2 C n f0g as a representative. Furthermore (0 : 0 : : : : : 0) is not a
valid point in projective space. Thus for any point (b^0 : : : : : b^n) there exists at least one
element b^i 6= 0.
There is a one-to-one relationship between the solutions of system (25) in Cn and
the solutions of system (26) in Cn+1 with b^0 6= 0. If b is a solution to (25) then the
line through b^ = (1; b), that is, [b^] 2 CP n, is a solution to (26). For the converse, if
(b^0 : b^1 : : : : : b^n) with b^0 6= 0 is a solution to (26) then the point ( b^1b^0 ; : : : ;
b^n
b^0
) is a solution
of (25).
One of the advantages of the homogenized system (26) is that it can model \innite"
solutions. If we have a line f(b) j  2 Cg  Cn, b 2 Cn n f0g and look at the
corresponding line f(1 : b1 : : : : ; bn) j  2 Cg in projective space then for any ,
( 1

: b1 : : : : : bn) is also a valid representation of that point on the projective line. So
if kk ! 1 then k 1

k ! 0 and we are left with the point (0 : b1 : : : : : bn). Note that
kk ! 1 in the ane space means kbk ! 1. Thus we traverse the line to \innity".
This observation leads to the following denition.
Denition 10. Consider the natural embedding of Cn with coordinates (z1; : : : ; zn) in
the projective space CP n with homogeneous coordinates (z0 : : : : : zn). Then we call
points (0 : b1 : : : : : bn) 2 CP n points at innity.
The value b^0 = 0 for a solution b^ to F^ implies f^i(b^0 : b^1 : : : : : b^n) = f
(di)
i (b^1; : : : ; b^n) =
0. Therefore the solutions at innity of F^ (z^) = 0 correspond to the solutions to the
system (f
(d1)
1 ; : : : ; f
(dn)
n ) = 0. The fact that we now have a representation of solutions at
innity leads to a new version of Bezout's theorem for projective space.
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Theorem 6 (Bezout's theorem in projective space CP n). If system (26) has only a nite
number of solutions in CP n and if d is the Bezout number of F , then it has exactly d
solutions (counting multiplicities) in CP n.
If we view the system of equation (26) in ane space Cn+1 instead of in complex pro-
jective space CP n then it is actually underdetermined because it consists of n equations
in n+1 unknowns. For a computer implementation of a homotopy method, however, we
need a determinate system of equations. For this purpose we add a simple normalization.
Using the described relationship between solutions of the two systems (25) and (26) we
can now introduce a third system to nd the solutions of system (25). Dene a new
linear function
u(z0; z1; : : : ; zn) = 0z0 + 1z1 + : : :+ nzn
with random coecients i 2 C. (The nongeneric cases are where the normalization line
is parallel to a solution \line".) Now dene
~fi(z0; z1; : : : ; zn) := f^i(z0; z1; : : : ; zn); i = 1; : : : ; n;
~f0(z0; z1; : : : ; zn) := u(z0; z1; : : : ; zn)  1:
(27)
The resulting system of equations
~F = ( ~f0; ~f1; : : : ; ~fn) = 0 (28)
has n + 1 equations in n + 1 variables. Note that the system ~F (z^) has the same total
degree d as the system F (z) in the original system of equations (25). As a start system
we choose
Gi(z0; z1; : : : ; zn) = z
di
i   zdi0 ; i = 1; : : : ; n;
G0(z0; z1; : : : ; zn) = u(z0; z1; : : : ; zn)  1:
(29)
We write the resulting system as G(z^) = 0 and dene the homotopy
H(t; z^) = t ~F (z^) + ei(1  t)G(z^) (30)
for a  2 [0; 2). To illustrate a possible diculty with this approach we examine the
system of equations (1,2,3) that we derived for the Bertrand price game in Section 2.2.
Example 4. After homogenization of the equilibrium system (1,2,3) in the variables px,
py, and Z with the variable x0 we obtain the following polynomial equations.
0 =  p2xx40   p2yx40 + Z2p2xp2y
0 =  2700x100 + 2700pxx90 + 8100Z2p2xx60   5400Z2p3xx50 + 51Z3p6xx10   2Z3p7x
0 =  2700x100 + 2700pyx90 + 8100Z2p2yx60   5400Z2p3yx50 + 51Z3p6yx10   2Z3p7y
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The solutions at innity are those for which x0 = 0. In this case the system simplies as
follows
Z2p2xp
2
y = 0;  2Z3p7x = 0;  2Z3p7y = 0:
After setting Z = 0 all equations hold for any values of px and py. There is a continuum of
solutions at innity. Such continua can cause numerical diculties for the path-following
procedure.
The following theorem now states that in spite of the previous example our paths
converge to the relevant isolated solutions.
Theorem 7. Let the homotopy H be as in (30) with Bezout number d. Then the following
statements hold for almost all  2 [0; 2):
1. The homotopy has d continuous solution paths.
2. Each path will either converge to an isolated nonsingular or to a singular15 solution,
i.e. one where the rank of the Jacobian drops.
3. If b is an isolated solution with multiplicity m, then there are m paths converging
to it.
4. Paths are monotonically increasing in t, i.e. the paths do not bend backwards.
Now we can apply the homotopy H as dened in equation (30) and nd all solutions
of the system (28). There will be no diverging paths. From the solutions of (28) we
easily obtain the solutions of the original system (25).
An additional advantage of the above approach lies in the possibility to scale our
solutions via u. If a solution component zi becomes too large, then this will cause
numerical problems, e.g. the evaluation of polynomials at such a point becomes rather
dicult. Thus if something like this happens we pick a new set of i. Furthermore we
eliminated the special case of innite paths and we do not have to check whether the
length of the path grows too large. Instead every diverging path has become a converging
one. So while tracking a path we do not need to check whether the length of the path
exceeds a certain bound.
Theoretically we have eliminated the problem of solutions at innity. Note that the
problem of diverging paths still remains in practice. A solution b belongs to a diverging
path if b0 = 0. We still need to decide when b0 becomes zero numerically. Thus there
is no absolute certainty if a path converges to a solution at innity or if the solution is
15This might be an isolated root with multiplicity higher than one, e.g. a double root of the system
F , or a non-isolated solution component as in Example 4.
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extremely large. However, we are in the convergence zone of Newton's method and can
quickly sharpen our solutions to an arbitrary precision.
Remark. Here we attempt to give some intuition for the problem of innite paths. Take
two lines L1 = f(x1; x2)jx1 + a12x2 + b1 = 0g and L2 = f(x1; x2)jx1 + a22x2 + b2 = 0g
with a12; a22 2 R. Then there are three possibilities for L1 \ L2. First L1 \ L2 = L1
so a12 = a22 and b1 = b2. Secondly L1 \ L2 = fpg for some point p 2 R2. Lastly we
have L1 \ L2 = ;, i.e. the lines are parallel and so a12 = a22 but b1 6= b2. By using
projective space we eliminate the last possibility by adding innity where the two lines
can meet. So in projective space the lines are given by the zero sets of the two polynomials
x1+ a12x2+ b1x0 and x1+ a22x2+ b2x0. Clearly (0 :  a12 : 1) is a common zero for these
polynomials if a12 = a22. So in projective space CP
n, n linear homogeneous polynomials
which are not pairwise identical intersect at exactly one point.
Bezout's theorem generalizes this idea to n polynomials. However the theorem im-
plicitly embeds the system of polynomials in projective space. Therefore we have to
consider the possibility that solutions are at innity and thus the paths that belong to
those diverge. The case that one of those intersection points lies at innity is equivalent
to demanding that z0 = 0. This is clearly a non-generic case. But the systems that
interest us are highly non-generic, the reason being that they are sparse. That means
for a degree d polynomial in n variables there are
 
n+d
d

monomials of degree equal or
smaller than d but most of their coecients are zero which is a non-generic condition.
Thus those systems tend to have many solutions at innity.
B m-homogeneous Bezout number
The number of paths d grows rapidly with the degree of individual equations. For many
economic models we believe that there are only a few (if not unique) equilibria, that
is, our systems have few real solutions and usually even fewer economically meaningful
solutions. As a result we may have to follow a large number of paths that do not yield
useful solutions. As we have seen in Example 4, there may be continua of solutions at
innity which can cause numerical diculties. Therefore it would be very helpful to
reduce the number of paths that must be followed as much as possible.
Two approaches for a reduction in the number of paths exist. The rst approach
sets the homogenized polynomial system not into CP n but in a product of m projective
spaces CP n1  : : : CP nm . For this purpose the set of variables is split into m groups.
In the homogenization of the original polynomial F each group of variables receives a
separate additional variable, thus this process is called m-homogenization. The resulting
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bound on the number of solutions, called the m-homogeneous Bezout number, is often
much smaller than the original bound and thus leads to the elimination of paths tending
to solutions at innity. In this paper we do not provide details on this approach but
only show its impact in our computational examples. We refer the interested reader to
Sommese and Wampler (2005) and the citations therein. The rst paper to introduce
m-homogeneity appears to be Morgan and Sommese (1987).
The second approach to reduce the number of paths is the use of parameter con-
tinuation homotopies. We believe that this approach is perfectly suited for economic
applications.
C Parameter Continuation Homotopy
Economic models typically make use of exogenous parameters such as risk aversion coef-
cients, price elasticities, cost coecients, or many other pre-specied constants. Often
we do not know the exact values of those parameters and so would like to solve the model
for a variety of dierent parameter values. Clearly solving the model each time \from
scratch" will prove impractical whenever the number of solution paths is very large. The
parameter continuation homotopy approach enables us to greatly accelerate the repeated
solution of an economic model for dierent parameter values. After solving one instance
of the economic model we can construct a homotopy that alters the parameters from
their previous to their new values and allows us to track solutions paths from the pre-
vious solutions to new solutions. Therefore, the number of paths we need to follow is
greatly reduced.
The parameter continuation approach rests on the following theorem which is a special
case of a more general result, see Sommese and Wampler (2005, Theorem 7.1.1).
Theorem 8 (Parameter Continuation). Let F (z; q) = (f1(z; q); : : : ; fn(z; q)) be a system
of polynomials in the variables z 2 Cn with parameters q 2 Cm,
F (z; q) : Cn  Cm ! Cn:
Additionally let q0 2 Cm be a point in the parameter space, where k = maxq jfz j F (z; q) =
0; det
 
@F
@z
(z; q0)
 6= 0gj is the number of nonsingular isolated solutions. For any other
set of parameters q1 and a random  2 [0; 2) dene
'(s) = eis(s  1) + sq1 + (1  s)q0
Then the following statements hold.
1. k = jfz j F (z; q) = 0; det  @F
@z
(z; q)
 6= 0gj for almost all q 2 Cm.
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2. The homotopy F (z; '(s)) = 0 has k nonsingular solution paths for almost all  2
[0; 2).
3. All solution paths converge to all isolated nonsingular solutions of F (z; '(1)) = 0
for almost all  2 [0; 2).
The theorem has an immediate practical implication. Suppose we already solved the
system F (z; q0) = 0 for some parameter vector q0. Under the assumption that this system
has the maximal number k of locally isolated solutions across all parameter values, we
can use this system as a start system for solving the system F (z; q1) = 0 for another
parameter vector q1. The number of paths that need to be tracked is k instead of the
Bezout number d or some m-homogeneous Bezout number. In our applications k is
much smaller (sometimes orders of magnitude smaller) than these upper bounds. As a
result the parameter continuation homotopy drastically reduces the number of paths that
we must track. More importantly, no path ends at a solution at innity for almost all
q1 2 Cn. As we observe in our examples, exactly these solutions often create numerical
problems for the path-tracking software, in particular if there are continua of solutions
at innity as in Example 4. And due to those numerical diculties the running times
for tracking these paths is often signicantly larger than for tracking paths that end at
nite solutions. In sum, we believe that the parameter continuation homotopy approach
is of great importance for nding all equilibria of economic models.
A statement similar to that of Theorem 8 holds if we regard isolated solutions of some
xed multiplicity. But we then have to track paths which have the same multiplicity.
Tracking such paths requires a lot more computational eort than non-singular paths.
The homotopy continuation software Bertini enables the user to track such paths since
it allows for user-dened parameter continuation homotopies.
D A splitting approach for solving larger systems
In our application of the all-solutions methods to dynamic stochastic games we quickly
run into problems that are too large to be solved on a single computer. We now briey
describe an approach that enables us to increase the size of problems we can solve.
A splitting approach16 breaks the square system
F (z1; z2; : : : ; zn) = (f1; f2; : : : ; fn) (z1; z2; : : : ; zn) = 0
of polynomial equations into two sub-systems F1 = (f1; : : : ; fp) and F2 = (fp+1; : : : ; fn).
16We thank Jonathan Hauenstein for suggesting this method to us.
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Similarly, the variables are grouped
(z1; z2; : : : ; zn) = (x; y) = (x1; : : : ; xp; y1; : : : yn p):
Thus, we can write the entire system as follows,
F1(x1; : : : ; xp; y1; : : : yn p) = (f1; : : : fp)(x1; : : : ; xn; y1; : : : yn p) = 0
F2(y1; : : : ; yn p; x1; : : : xp) = (fp+1; : : : fn)(y1; : : : ; yn p; x1; : : : xp) = 0:
Clearly, F1 and F2 are not square systems of polynomial equations. We now solve the
systems
F1(x1; : : : ; xp; y1; : : : yn p) = 0
yi = ai; i = 1; : : : ; n  p;
and
F2(y1; : : : ; yn p; x1; : : : xp) = 0
xj = bj; j = 1; : : : ; p;
where a 2 Cn p and b 2 Cp are random complex numbers. Each of these two new square
systems has a smaller (m-homogeneous) Bezout number than the original system.
Now suppose that we obtain nite solution setsM1 andM2 for each of the two systems,
respectively. Any pair (x; a; y; b) 2 M1  M2 is a solution to the following square
system of polynomial equations in the unknowns x1; : : : ; xp, y1; : : : ; yn p, r1; : : : ; rn p,
and s1; : : : ; sp,
F1(x1; : : : ; xp; r1; : : : rn p) = 0
ri   ai = 0; i = 1; : : : ; n  p;
F2(y1; : : : ; yn p; s1; : : : sp) = 0
sj   bj = 0; j = 1; : : : ; p:
This system is now the start system for the following parameter continuation homotopy,
where r and s are the parameters,
F1(x1; : : : ; xp; r1; : : : rn p) = 0
(1  t)(ri   ai) + t(ri   yi) + (1  t)tei = 0; i = 1; : : : ; n  p;
F2(y1; : : : ; yn p; s1; : : : sp) = 0
(1  t)(sj   bj) + t(sj   xj) + (1  t)tei = 0; j = 1; : : : ; p;
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with all elements in M1 M2 being start points. Thus there are jM1j  jM2j paths to
track. Observe that for t = 1 we obtain a system that is equivalent to the original system
F (z) = 0.
To see why this approach works, note that our parameters r and s have been chosen
randomly. Statement (1) of Theorem 8 states that for almost all choices of those param-
eters we have the maximal number of isolated roots. Thus all the requirements of the
theorem are met and our homotopy converges to all isolated solutions.
A judicious separation of the original equations produces two subsystems with respec-
tive Bezout numbers that are roughly equal to the square root of the Bezout number of
the original system. This signicant reduction in the number of paths to be tracked may
make it feasible to solve the subsystems even if the complete system cannot be solved in
reasonable time. And if the number of nite solutions of the subsystems is also not too
large, then the parameter continuation homotopy will generate all nite solutions of the
original system of equations.
In Section 8.2.2 this splitting approach enables us to solve a system of polynomial
equations that otherwise would have been too large to be solvable on a single laptop.
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